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Article 6

: Book Review

BOOK REVIEW
WHERE THE LA W ENDS- The Social Control of Corporate Behavior, By
Christopher D. Stone; Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1975. Pp. xiii,
273 (hard cover).
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These
are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it
was created.'

Imagine the scene from Herman Melville's "Bartleby, the Scrivener," where
the beleaguered Scrivener looks forlornly out of his employer's Wall Street
office window at (into?) a blank wall. 2 What thoughts can possibly be passing
through the troubled mind of this archtype of the forlorn, modern exile?3 Per*Professor of Law, University of Southern California
I. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat 19) 517, 638 (1819). (Mr.
Chief Justice John Marshall) This case is often viewed as the first exegesis (progenitor) of the legal
personality of a corporation in American jurisprudence.
2. Melville, Bartlehy. The Scrivener, PUTNAM'S MONTHLY MAGAZINE, Nov.& Dec. 1853,at 556
[hereinafter cited as PUTNAM]; H. MELVILLE, ANNUAL 1965 A SyMPosiuM BARTLEBY TIlE SCRIVENER

(1965).
To reconstruct the setting, the reader can examine the description of the Scrivener's employer of
his own office location:
My chambers were up stairs at No. __
Wall Street. At one end they looked upon the
white wall of the interior of a spacious skylight shaft, penetrating the building from top
to bottom ... the view from the other end of my chambers offered, at least, a contrast, if
nothing more. In that direction my windows commanded an unobstructed view ofa lofty
brick wall, black by age and everlasting shade..." PUTNAM at 547.
Later the employer-narrator relates the following about the Scrivener: "The next day I noticed that
Bartleby did nothing but stand at his window in his deadwall revery." PUTNAM at 556.
3. The following quotes from Friedman, Bartlehv and the Modern E.xile.
in H. MELVILLE,
ANNUAL 1965 A SYMPosIUM BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER 64 (1965) [hereinafter cited as H. MELVILLE]
and M. FRIEDMAN, PROBLEMATIC REBEL: AN IMAGE OF MODERN MAN 52 (1963) help explain what is
meant by these terms:
Bartleby is a Modern Exile. He does not merely represent that exile of man from paradise
which has characterized the human condition from earliest times. He also represents that
special intensification of exile that arises from the "death of God" and the alienation of
modern man. The "death of God," as that phrase has been used from Nietzsche down.
is not a statement about God but about man's alienation itself. H. MELVILLE at 64.
Friedman continues defining his terms with this quote:
Melville's "almighty forlornness" stands opposed to any form of idealism or mysticism
that tends to abolish the gulf between man and the world. Man is the creature whose existence is limited in space and time and who knows it; the creature whose life is conditioned
by his knowledge of death. He has to face the infinite and know that it is infinite and he is
finite. But this is just what specifically modern man cannot bear. For modern man can no
longer believe, as primitive man could, that he is one with a natural-spiritual order... As
man of modern consciousness, he is cut off from all that. Fully aware of his individuality
and his individual mortality, he exchanges the consolations that are inaccessible to him
for the defiance of the Modern Rebel or the forlornness of the Modern Exile. (citations
omitted) Id. at 71.
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haps Professor Stone has supplied us with answers in his book Where The Law
Ends.4 In all probability, Stone's Bartleby would be seeking the "conjunction of
truth and social 'reality' "5 in the context of controlling certain coroprate behavior legally. 6 In sum, he would be seeking to give socially meaningful testimony to
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's penetrating observation in the Dartmouth College
case which was quoted above.
But why select the literary character Bartleby as the focal point and dramatic
protagonist for a law professor's ideas on controlling socially certain corporate
behavior? A close examination of Bartleby demonstrates that he is the quintessence of the sensitized modern "technological man" whose desire to end his
Friedman continues explaining his interpretation in the following quote:
The forlornness of the Modern Exile is not only that of loneliness. It is a self surrounded
by an oppressive, infinite reality of non-self that threatens at every moment to blot out the
self. This oppressiveness can be experienced... in the world of Bartleby, a world in which
the self stands without relation to other selves, without any assertion of its own existence
or demand placed upon the existence of others, other than the sheer negative selfassertion of "I prefer not to." Id. at 72.
4. The eminent English political philosopher John Locke stated the point dramatically and
forcefully with his statement that "Wherever Law ends, Tyranny begins." J. LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, § 202 (1690); FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 372 (Bartlett Fourteenth ed. 1968).
See also, E. BURKE, LETTER TO THE SHERIFFS OF BRISTOL; 2000 FAMOUS LEGAL QUOTATIONS 400
(1967): "Liberty to be enjoyed, must be limited by Law, for law ends where tyranny begins, and
the tyranny is the same, be it the tyranny of a monarch, or of a multitude-nay, the tyranny of the
multitude may be the greater, since it is multiplied tyranny."
The title Where The Law Ends denotes the frightening end of social regulation. It also connotes
a sense of lawlessness, barbarity, lack of civilized behavior, and totalitarianism of one form or
another. In short, the end of law demarcates the boundaries of the civilized political community so
important to the harmonious life and development of the individual in Anglo-American political
ideas. When some individual, fictional or not, either refuses to obey the law thereby circumscribing
his or its natural liberty in the Burkean sense, or becomes so powerful that he or it is not subject to the
full force and effect of the law, tyranny can result. In this situation, Stone is referring to the tyranny
of the large corporations. See note 51, infra.
5. This phrase is explained in the following quote from the writings of the English psychiatrist,
R.D. Laing:
Few books today, are forgivable. Black on the canvas, silence on the screen, an empty
white sheet of paper are perhaps feasible. There is little conjunction of truth and social
,reality' . . . Around us are psuedo-events to which we adjust with a false consciousness
adopted to see these events as true and real, and even as beautiful. In the society of men the
truth resides now less in what things are than in what they are not. Our social realities are
so ugly if seen in the light of exiled truth, and beauty is almost no longer possible if it is not
a lie ... Nevertheless, the requirement of the present, the failure of the past, is the same: to
provide a thoroughly self-conscious and self-critical human account of man. R. LAING,
POLITICS

of

EXPERIENCE,

XI-XII (1967).

6. The following quote could apply equally to Stone:
This is a study of the very large corporation in American society, the leviathan that gives
the American economic order the characteristic feature that distinguishes it from most of
the rest of the world. These are enterprises of enormous magnitude with such profound
impact on the lives and fortunes of so many human beings, communities, and even nations
that they must be regarded as a unique phenomenon. Unless we recognize that these very
large corporations, or megacorporations, are different in kind and degree from corporations generally, we cannot understand their implications for democratic society or deal
effectively with establishing appropriate political controls over these centers of economic,
political and social power. (citations omitted)
P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE
POWER

i, 1 (1975).

From time to time, the book review will use interchangeably "large corporation" and "megacorporation."
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alienation would stimulate him to search for effective means to reassert control
over these important institutions in his social environment. Bartleby is representative of the person who could be energized more quickly to work through his
alienation, apathy, and confusion to reach social reform. Like Stone, Bartleby is
in the state of ready sensitivity needing only guidance and direction to carry out a
rebellion. Equally important, Bartleby crystallizes the character profile of the
modern alienated man facing a painful paradox. This modern man both depends
on modern corporations for important items in his daily existence such as jobs,
food, and clothing, and is harmed seriously by the corporations' operations.
Plainly, Bartleby is the archtype of the excited exile and rebel who could not so
easily, but dearly and urgently need, to embark on Stone'sjourney to find the "conjunction point" necessary to form the base of social action. (Paraphrasing
Beckett, "I can't do it, I must do it!") Thusly, a focus on Bartleby helps us to
-comprehend the complex social environment which surrounds the intricate
psychological underworld that is beneath Stone's ideas. In this sense, he sheds
light on the ontogeny of a rebellion, and in turn intensifies our comprehension
-of the compelling arguments supporting Stone's analysis.
In addition, recall Bartleby was employed in the matrix of a legal-commercial world which is important to the growth of large corporations. Ironically,
Bartleby's employer, a lawyer, is representative of a group which has had a very
large hand in helping these corporations to elude social control. 7 Simply stated,
Bartleby demonstrates the paradox of the legally trained technological man, or
at least a technological man thrust in the midst of the legal community. Stone's
Bartleby dramatizes the need for those knowledgeable about the legal community to overcome the syndrome of complicity to persuade and guide the lawyers to be spearheads for social change.
The adaptation of Bartleby's character for my present analysis, then, serves
the purposes noted. Furthermore, it rivets attention on the fact that the omnipresent modern exile, flesh and blood characters such as you and I, and not some
remote, lifeless fictional figure (the "reasonable man") is in the vortex of the
dilemma of controlling socially this modern incubus. 8 Thus, viewing Stone's
book through the character of Bartleby gives a valuable insight (also exegesis)
into the ideas expounded.
Having set forth the above, how is Stone's Bartleby transported from his employer's office into the heart of social action? A conceivable scenario would be
7. In a cynical manner, Ambrose Bierce once defined the lawyer as "one skilled in circumventing the law." But in a more positive manner, another writer stresses the role of the lawyer in a
business corporation in the following fashion:
When the business corporation is born, the lawyer is the midwife who brings it into existence; while it functions he is its philosopher, guide and friend; in trouble he is its
champion, and when the end comes and the last sad rites must be performed, the lawyer
becomes the undertaker who disincorporates it and makes final report to the Director of
Internal Revenue.
R. REDFIELD, FACTORS OF GROWTH IN A LAW PRACTICE 30 (1962).
8. In essence, this focus on the human predicament in a social environment which is manipulated by corporations has elements of an existential philosophical analysis. See W. BARRETT,
IRRATIONAL MAN A STUDY IN EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY (1958).
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the following. Return to the picture of Bartleby looking out of the window. He
perceives the deleterious impact of the very large corporations on his physical
and intellectual environment. 9 But assume Bartleby wants to reject despair and
escapism so as to transcend his alienations to achieve knowledge he can translate
into a plan for social action. Hence, a complete withdrawal into his solipsistic
universe, constant refusals to join the carnage in the form of a snappy "I prefer
not to," or idle wishing will not aid him in reaching his goal. "Bartleby, the Reformer." must take some concrete and positive steps. Perhaps the proper approach is to start with the task of reanalyzing the "corporate problem." Conceivably, this approach can lead to the discovery of a new analytical framework.
And in turn, perhaps this reexamination will lead to a different jurisprudential
conceptualization of large corporations in a manner which will engender the
social accountability society should demand of these collectives of individuals. 0
Taking this view, Stone's book appears to be more than a rehash of existing
theories on how large corporations operate. Then too, it is not another simple
chronicle of the horrors of corporate operations. He is about serious social reform. As adumbrated above, Stone is a social critic who seeks to analyze the
conceptual framework of corporations and the social regulation of their behavior. In essence, his task is to reconceptualize politically and jurisprudentially
these significant social institutions so as to supply society with a meaningful
prescriptiveI and normative' 2 analysis for restructuring legal control of their
operations.
To inaugurate his analysis, Stone (qua Bartleby) begins with a reexamination
of the so-called "corporate problem." He does such by briefly reexamining the
historical roots of the "corporate problem" going back to the nineteenth century.
He observes that corporations perennially are near or in the center of important
social actions. In fact, they are some of the most influential "private forces" for
9. See W.

ROGERS, CORPORATE COUNTRY,

A

STATE SHAPED TO SUIT TECHNOLOGY

(1973)

[hereinafter cited as ROGERS], and N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
(1973) (as well as the citations contained therein) for recent treatments of the often deleterious impact on the society. Many other prominent writers could be added to this list.
10. Ambrose Bierce, in his DEVIL'S DICTIONARY (1926) once captured the lack of social accountability in his statement that "[corporations are] an ingenious device for obtaining individual profit
without individual responsibility."
II. The following quotation helps define the term:
Prescription refers to theory about the factual prospects of bringing about desired conditions. Thus, it tells you that if you wish to reach certain goals (either ultimate or instrumental), you should undertake such and such a prescribed course of action. To put the
case in a slightly different way, prescriptive theory predicts the relative costs of alternative
means to valued ends.
D. MINAR, IDEAS AND POLITICS THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 8 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
MINOR].

12. Id. Similarly, Minar defines this term thusly: "Normative theory, on the other hand, deals
with questions of what should or ought to be rather than what is-with matters of moral quality."Id.
Note, this focus on moral questions is conceived as consistent with the view some persons have of the
law teaching profession. See, HOFSTADLER, THE AGE OF REFORM 158 (1956) (calls law professors
"keepers of the professional conscience.")
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both social good and harm. Hence, modern attempts to solve the myriad of
social problems really involve efforts to solve the "corporate problem." Nonetheless, Stone believes the term "corporate problem" requires a deeper analysis
than most writers present. Neither simply rehashing the numerous examples
(consequences) of the corporate problem, nor viewing it from the more modern
angle of the cold light of "statistical tables and graphs" showing the growth of
concentration is beneficial. In his estimation, deeper analysis drives the observer
to conclude that the core of the problem is a cancerous, "untrammeled influence" lacking any sense of responsibility for its actions, 3 fueled by modern technology and increased social needs.' 4
More importantly, and moving beyond the essence of the corporate problem,
Stone asks himself a question which serves as the springboard for his
perscriptive and normative analysis. Why has society failed to control this influence? He concludes the failure is a result of the inability of the main institutional control of society, the law,1 5 to regulate the influence. He postulates that
his own analysis must focus on the actual operations of corporations, in light of
this failure to discover how to compel this heretofore uncontrolled influence to
exhibit more social accountability. And, he observes that no models exist to
guide him. He states that to date no systematic jurisprudential examination of
how to inject social accountability into this influence has been made. 16 Much of
13. To demonstrate the fact that the corporate problem has existed some time and that others
observed its earlier existence, we can examine the following quote:
Unlimited competition seems to press too hardly on the weak. The power of groups of men
organized by incorporation as joint-stock companies, or small knots of rich men acting in
combination, has developed with unexpected strength in unexpected ways, overshadowing individuals and even communities, and showing that the very freedom of association
which men sought to secure by law when they were threatened by the violence of potentates may, under the shelter of the law, ripen into a new form of tyranny.
J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 26-77 (1888). See also Oleck, Remedies for Abuses
of CorporateStates, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464 n. 3 (1973).
14. Herbert Marcus, in his book ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN OF STUDIES IN THE IDEALOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY, (1964), states the point thusly: "Our society distinguishes itself by conquering the centrifugal social forces with Technology rather than Terror, on the
dual basis of an overwhelming efficiency and on increased standard of living." Id. at x.
The reader should note that the book review closely connects technology and the corporate
problem. Actually technology is a broader term when it takes into account governmental involvement, the science profession, institutions of higher learning in which a good amount of scientific
work takes place, and private science foundations in which a smaller amount of scientific work takes
place. Nonetheless, the growth of and development of large aggregations of resources into corporate
forms is so closely intertwined with the developments and expansion of technology that they can be
very closely connected. In fact, a large part of the analysis of the evolution of a technological
society involves a focus on the corporate problem. See e.g., notes 9 supra, and 76 & 86 infra.
15. Professor Harold Laski quizzically and sardonically commented on the interplay ofcorporations and the law in the following manner: "Corporations will have a curious habit of attempting
perpetually to escape from the rigid bounds in which they have been encased. May we not say that,
like some Frankenstein (sic), they show ingratitude to their creatorsT'
Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404, 407 (1916).
16. See Cary, A proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act. 29 B34. L 1101 (1974);
Oleck, Remedies for Abuses of Corporate Status, supra; Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management
Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors,and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375
(1975); The Greening of the Board Room: Reflections on Corporate Responsibility, 10 COLUM J. L.
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the traditional social, political, and jurisprudential thinking has focused solely
on the "question of individual freedom." Moreover, the valuable works on individual and group behavior from the disciplines of sociology and psychology
have not been assimilated within jurisprudential ideas to help us to comprehend
how to define social accountability. 7 In sum, his task is to extend "Sociological
Jurisprudence" or expand the more recent "Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence."
In order to demonstrate the value (and comparison) of his suggested jurisprudential approach, Stone delves into an examination of this historical development of the jurisprudential concept of the corporation. In Part I of his book,
he argues that the law was concerned initially with "individual identifiable persons, operating outside of complex institutional frameworks" 18 who inflicted
harm on fellow humans. To control his problem, the legal system "responded
with rules and concepts built upon contemporary notions about individuals."19
At this juncture in history, the impact and consequences of corporate behavior
had yet to be viewed seriously due to the then recent development of corporations. Instead, the law focused on the corporation's legal capacity. Gradually,
however, this view changed as society began to perceive corporations as actors
in the social drama. In short, society began to see the social problems resulting
from corporate activities. Yet, he argues that this second wave of response was
not inconsistent with earlier legal development. Still corporations were visualized as expanded human beings with a similar legal personality to that possessed
by humans.
Even as the social pressures increased in an allegro manner, Stone observes
that the society made only minor adjustments in the conceptual framework of
the law. In Part II of the book, he argues that the main focus of the adjustments
was on restructuring "shareholder- management relations. '20 For example, the
response to rampant public investor fraud was to arrange the "organizational
structure and decision process." '21 But he notes, this readjustment mainly sought
to protect the private investor. Injuries to the general public were still viewed as
actions of "persons" or "individuals." Accordingly these actions received the
traditional legal treatment which was given socially undesirable human conduct
by the civil and criminal laws.
& SOC. PROB. 15 (1973), N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, (1973) [here-

inafter cited

as CHAMBERLAIN] and R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATIONS, (W.W. Norton & Co. 1976). This isnot an exhaustive listing. These writings however, are

some of the more stimulating and well written views. In addition, Chamberlain does attempt to
analyze and critique some of these proposals in his chapter 9.
17. But see A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1972). Professor Ehrenzweig

attempts to merge jurisprudence with Freudian psychology. He does not however, explore the law of
corporations in light of this merger.
Professor Laski, supra note 15 at 424 stated a similar point at an earlier time:
After all, our legal theories will and must be judged by their applicability to the facts they
endeavor to resume. It is clear enough that unless we threat the personality of our group
persons as real and apply the fact of that reality throughout the whole realm of law, what
we call justice will, in truth, be no more than a chaotic and illogical muddle.
18. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS I, 1 (1975).

19. Id. See also J.
UNITED STATES

HURST,

THE

LEGITIMACY OF BUSINESS CORPORATIONS IN THE LAW OF THE

1780-1970, (1970) [hereinafter cited as

20. Id. at 27.
21. Id.
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol10/iss1/6
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Furthermore, Stone argues that this response continued unmodified until the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The antitrust legislation of this
period demonstrated greater concern for the wider social impact of corporate
actions. Nonetheless, he postulates that this response, as well as latter twentieth
century responses, missed the mark. He concludes that the law fails to comprehend that it cannot confront "big business" in a modern society "with a negative profit contingency (a civil judgment, a criminal fine)" 22 for social violations.
Nor can the law confront "big business" by threatening the loss of monies or im23
prisonment directed at "key" executives.
Turning his attention to the late twentieth century, Stone mentions various
proposals which have been suggested to solve the corporate problem. But he
argues that these proposals amount to the use of shibboleths such as "shareholder democracy," "federal chartering," or "corporate responsibility" to cover
vague notions of corporate control. 24 These proposals fail to make a more systematic examination of the functions of federal chartering of corporations, and
the functioning of the boards of directors hence, they fail to achieve a more
meaningful system of social controls. Moreover, they fail to carefully examine
the "notion of corporate social responsibility;" they do not discover "its scope
and purpose with enough precision that its spirit can be translated into tangible
25
institutional reform."
Building on this analysis, Stone gets to the heart of his prescriptive and
normative analysis in Part IV of the book. He argues that the other proposals do
not make allowances for the complexity of the corporate problem. In essence,
the corporate problem is an amalgam of many problems of untrammeled influence. Due to the diversity of present day corporate operations, modern corporations perform various roles, inter alia, as producers, consumers, and employers.
Moreover, the measures which might be used to bring about regulation in one of
these spheres of activity may not be adequate to address problems in other
spheres. For example, the measures which might be used to address consumer or
employer problems may not be the same measures used to address the problems
of the production of dangerous goods. Furthermore, he stresses that "corporations vary among themselves." 26 Closed corporations with greater merging of the
shareholder and manager roles ".... are likely to be more sensitive to profit threat
strategies than are the giant broadly held corporations, in which the managers
are basically employees, their salary and tenure more or less independent of the
corporation's legal damages." 27 Finally, corporations also differ according to
the particular industry. For instance, a drug industry corporation may operate
22. Id at 29.
23. Id. The recent bribery and slush fund scandals which involve hugh payoffs by major American corporate executives to foreigri agents to obtain business and to American political candidates
substantiates this point. Election laws, federal criminal laws, and the securities laws have barely controlled this behavior. The worse losses suffered by these individuals were the momentary public
embarassments after disclosure, and in a few cases, job terminations.
24. Id. at 71. See also CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 16.
25. HURST, supra note 19, at 72.
26. Id. at 119.
27. Id.
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and create problems alien to the steel industry. Hence, uniform responses with
general measures may have inherent failure factors.
Therefore, Stone concludes afortiori that vague proposals underneath attractive slogans "masquerading as a solution" are misconceived and impotent. These
ideas are hardly able to impact on the "traditional legal strategies," to
facilitate creation of "...the internal institutional configurations that are necessary if some problem is to be remedied, that is, to induce the ideal authority
structures, pattern of information flow, and the like."2,_ critical for reforming
socially undesirable behavior. What is needed is recognition that the problems
now require a more meaningful remedy which must involve the use of'"... some
institutional analogue to the role that responsibility plays in the human being,
guiding action toward certain values where the ordinary legislative prohibitions
are unavailable or, on balance, unwise."2 9 In short, the society must seek those
"critical organizational variables" which lead to corporate responsibility in
addressing specific problems. Only then, after completing this construction,
should "traditional legal strategies" be used as supplements.
30
Before proceeding further to critique this analysis, several germane ideas
which permeate and undergird Stone's analysis must be interposed. This brief
discussion serves three purposes. Firstly, it helps elucidate further the role of
Bartleby as the focal point of the book review. Secondly, it helps elucidate the
objectives and goal of Stone's analysis. And thirdly, it helps to lay the foundation which the book review will use in critiquing Stone's analysis.
The adopted starting point of this discussion is an examination of the selected
literary and philosophical expostulations (excerpts from an intellectual continuum) on the technological society/corporate problem. A good launching
point is a further examination of Melville's Bartleby. As stated above, Bartleby
can be interpreted as the quintessence of modern alienated man set within the
28. Id. at 120.
29. lid.
30. Briefly stated, these ideas can be grouped loosely under the classification of intellectual
writings which form a continuum of thoughts on man's existential predicament. The relevant subcategories are literary, philosophy, psychology, sociology, politics, and jurisprudence. Literary
writings refers to those attempts by great storytellers to seek a knowledge of mankind, and make
philosophical statements about the human condition. Philosophical writings refer to those attempts
to state organized beliefs in the recognized philosophical tracts. Psychological writings refer to those
attempts to examine the "underworld" of man's psyche or the motivational character. Sociological
writings refer to those attempts to explore individual and group behavior within and without social
institutions. Political writings refer to attempts to reflect on how men organize into power relationships for their own development and the needs to reach theirgoals by making authoritative decisions.
These writings pay special interest to liberty, authority and order. Jurisprudence refers to both the
philosophy of law, and the attempt to scientifically apply the concept of law to social engineering.
Close inspection uncovers the fact that the above categories greatly overlap each other. Instead
of causing uneasiness, this helps to underscore the fact that Stone's book is part of a broad, unified
heritage of ideas on man's existence which sometimes, for convenience sake, is segregated into the
above mentioned shorthand subcategories.
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evolving legal-commercial world. 31 His employer, a "Wall Street" lawyer,3 2 is, in
turn, enraptured by an important tenet at the heart of technological advancement, ". . . that the easiest way of life is the best." 33 Unchallenging adherence to
this tenet leads the employer to easily become a "robot handmaiden" to large
business interests, and to amass material wealth to the exclusion of the public
interest. Bartleby, however, refuses to adopt this attitudinal framework. This
contrapuntal juxtaposition of Bartleby with his employer dramatizes Bartleby's
alienation from this work setting, his employer's values, and the subtle oppres34
sion and deterrence he suffers in his quest for joining truth and social reality.
At the same time, Melville causes Bartleby to rebel against the stifling environmental strangulation of life within this commercial setting. In this sense of
opting for rebellion Bartleby becomes the missing conscience of the lawyer qua
mankind. 35 (Ironically, the amanuensis reasons and rebels, while the legally
trained analytical mind slavishly follows the "captains of industry.")
Taking up where Melville leaves off in his examination, other later writers perceptively expand on the predicament of Bartleby. They complete the picture of
the functioning of alienated mankind within the technological society/corporate
problem. Nonetheless, due to a shortage of space and because of personal preference, only two of these writers will be examined. The selected combination
sufficiently amplify and expand on Melville's ideas to form a bridge to Stone's
analysis.
In his book The Sane Society, Erich Fromm picks up the thread of Melville's
ideas. Fromm postulates that in creating his industrial complex, man made this
complex his "new god." Thusly, man gravitated from an egocentric world
which, revolved around his spiritual deliverance and search for the Almighty to
which seeks material gain. In doing this, man increasingly became alienated
from himself. Over time, man's worth became an integral part of this search for
the industrial nirvana. In Fromm's analysis, the end product of this transmogrification was not simply a slave, but a "robot." 36 Man's industrial machine now
operates to control man by establishing his worth and needs, mainly in con31.

H. MELVILLE, supra note 3, at 104. This placement of Bartleby is interpreted in the following

manner:
Melville's execution of "Bartleby" is rigidly controlled by the subject ot me story-the

moral relativism ... The Wall Street setting evokes the new religion of materialism,
and John Jacob Astor, the high priest of financial duplicity, incarnates the ruling ethic
of callous self-interest. Melville therefore assigns the role of the protagonist to a

disciple of the businessman, a lawyer... With the appearance (a stranger in fact and
private identity), the lawyer's bland assumptions of respectability are challenged, and

he is forced into an involuntary questioning of his hitherto unexamined attitudes and
values.
32. Id. at 106. Stein notes that the lawyer's location serves to show the debasement of life by
commerical activity. The wall cuts off "all natural light" and life, the office "is literally walled in by
the wealth of Wall Street."
33. Melville, "Bartleby, the Scrivener," supra at 546.
34. Significantly, this can be interpreted to place the "legal custodians of the public conscience"

under the "stupendous power exercised by capitalistic enterprise." Stein, supra at 105. See Note 7,
supra.
35. Id. at 106.
36. Fromm, The Sane Society, p. 312 (1975).
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sumption terms; now man is converted into an economic commodity. Fromm
concludes that man's salvation lies in creating a "Humanistic Communitarian
Socialism" 37 to help release his society from this bondage.
The other writer, Herbert Marcuse, adds still another dimension to these
ideas. In his book One Dimensional Man, he postulates that any critical analysis
of modern society needs to confront certain realities. Advanced technological
society is resilient, plastic, and completely capable of absorbing the opposing
forces of change. 38 Technological society gives birth to new "forms of life
(and power) which appear to reconcile the forces opposing the system and to
defeat or refute all protest. . ."3 Any critical analysis could find itself addressing
a basically happy, complacent society. In fact, the society may have lost the
impetus for rebellion. The modem critical observer may encounter a society
which is radically transformed from the period when the "need for refusal and
subversion was embodied in the action of effective social forces. '40 As he postulates, the "categories of critical social theory.., were essentially negative and oppositionl concepts, defining the actual contradictions in nineteenth century
42
European society." 4' Now, social realities cancel the thrust of these categories.
Marcuse, therefore, postulates that any meaningful critical theory which seeks
to overcome the above must transcend simple idle speculation. He concludes, as Stone demonstrates, that an effective critical theory must focus on the
"historical position in the sense that it must be grounded on the capability of
43
the given society."
Although the above has been couched in literary, philosophical, and sociological terms, permeating Stone's analysis are decisions on what Marcuse calls
"political economy." 4 Thus, any brief discussion of the intellectual backdrop
requires an equal examination of the political ideas. The need is to illuminate
the society's views on the proper uses of power, its aspirations, its needs, and its
goals. 45 For a critical theory of any merit must confront these political realities of
our society. These ideas are the base used to construct our social-political culture. Phrased differently, they yield ". . clues to such things as the trajectory of
development of institutions and the root sources of value commitments." 46 In
37. Id. at 315. Minar, supra at 375 has defined communitarian in the following fashion:
"By communitarian we refer to the perspective that interprets the community collectively as the fundamental building block, the primary unit of theoretical analysis of
the social world. Such theories posit a higher rationality, an integrity, and/or a higher
value to the community than to individual men."
Likewise, John Dewey, infra Note 53, uses a communitarian perspective. Minar, Id. at 373-375.
38. Marcuse, supra at xii.
39. Id.
40. Id. at xiv.
41. Marcuse states "(t)he category 'society' itself expressed the acute conflict between the social
and political sphere-society as antagonistic to the state. Similarly 'individual,' 'class,' 'private,'
'family,' denoted spheres and forces not yet integrated with the established conditions-spheres of
tension and contradiction." Ibid.
42. Id.

43. Id. at XV.
44. W. at XIV.

45. Minar, supra at I.
46. Id. at 5.
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sum, they lead to an analysis of "culturally shared beliefs, expectations, and
group commitments," as well as an analysis of the structuring of the authoritative decision making apparatus. 47 Furthermore, any critical theory must make
allowances for the impact of social interaction on the political ideas. Sometimes
new social groupings, or social interaction cause renewed examination of the
political ideas. Indeed, in the Poundian sense, the resulting "competing social
interests" often drive us pass renewed analysis to vey for political and legal
48
recognition.
Speaking more specifically, American political thought contains several germane ideas whose separate development and interplay permeate and undergird
Stone's critical theory. First, American political ideas stress a belief in the concept of a "National Covenant" which creates a beatific community. Early puritan inhabitants of America strongly believed that this shared a "National Covenant" with God. 49 Men who participated in the good works under a state of
grace could strive to maintain a sense of national community. Second, to this
view must be added another "communitarian" perspective. Similar to the
organicism of the puritans, and grafted on to it are the ideas of Rousseau. More
importantly than taking individuals out of the state of nature and placing them
in a political community, Rousseau premised the operations of this political
community on the exercise of the sovereign power which flows out of the spiritual force of the unified individuals. To this spiritual force, he appended the title
"General Will." 5()
Third, another set of ideas develops a significant contrapuntal strain to the
above two. These ideas flow from Locke's view of the political community.
Briefly stated, his individualistic orientation focuses on the protection of the
individuals' inalienable rights. To accomplish this goal, they constructed a political community which was endowed with the power to place restraints on the
deprivation of these rights.5' In turn, the political community mandates the
development of constitutional devices, structures, and guides to circumscribe
the exercise of legitimate political power.
47. Id. at 9. "by culture [we mean], the repository of habitual ways of looking at things and responding to stimuli; by social structure, patterns of interaction."
48. E. ROSTOW, THE SOVERIGN PREROGATIVE; THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW
xiv, xv (1962). Rostow stated the same point thusly:
These cardinal ideas of the law-ideas aboutjustice and order, and about procedure for
seeking them-have great stability. Legal institutions change, as they should, in response
to changing social pressures and changes in moral attitude. Yet behind the movement of
change there is a body of norms, or aspirations, to which our law and our people are
tenaciously loyal. These basic ideals of law must be reinterpreted and achieved anew as
they are used by each generation in seeking to solve the problems of its own experience.
49. MINAR, supra note 11, at 22-31.
50. D. NOBLE, HISTORIANS AGAINST HISTORY 10 (1965).
5 1. MINAR, supra note I1, at 31-54. John Locke is most significant. His adaptation of Hobbes'
"interest concept" to include property-life, liberty and estates-forms the basis of the social compact. In turn, the social compact seeks to establish the limits of civil society, the basic political community; it seeks to control socially the individual and other important social actors (entities). Conversely, this civil society or political community is a key to the harmonious development of the individual. Id. at 48. See note 4, supra.
MINAR, supra note 11, at 132, mentions Locke's views represent the "central tradition of
American political thought."
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Fourth, coexisting with the above is the set of ideas called pragmatism or
instrumentalism. This highly significant, but not always fully understood or
appreciated, twentieth century philosophical movement had a large impact on
the political and jurisprudential thought of the early twentieth century. Condensed for present purposes, pragmatism, or instrumentalism as its adherents
viewed the ideas, 52 sought the useful instead of the ultimate values for themselves. The stress was placed on the nature of experience, 53 the "workability and
reality of dynamic" interactions, 54 and the role of human creative force and
will. 55 The aim was to seek a dynamic theory of society; to break away from
the absolutism of past thinking to systematize, synthesize, and formulate responses to Spencerian Individualism and Classical Liberalism. 56 Thusly, in its
social statement and political call to action, instrumentalism sought to challenge
57
the ideas which underlie the technological society/corporate problem.
Jettisoning the other members of this school of philosophy to focus on the
more germane ideas for the present discussion, John Dewey primarily exploited
the potential of instrumentalism to create a socio-political theory. 58 Tersely
stated, he sensed experience, interpreted as an organic interaction and interconnection with the human mind playing an important role, served as a basis for
social action. In essence, creative change springs forth from the interaction of
the human mind with the environment. Thus, the key to the interaction and
change is human intelligence. 59 And intelligence is viewed as a learned disposition, not a faculty of the mind exercised at will. 60 This fact means that humans
are able to establish and highlight whatever behavior they want to stress to reconstruct their environment and experiences. 61 Rather than remaining as docile,
passive victims of modern technological society who sometimes despair or
escape from challenges to intelligence, 62 humans should persist in efforts to discover the more ideal and valuable patterns of behavior.
In light of this view, Dewey concluded that Classical Liberalism is a faulty
conceptualization of how society should operate. He believed that the two
strands of Classical Liberalism, 63 one political and the other economic, "thought
52. J. DEWEY, ON EXPERIENCE, NATURE, AND FREEDOM xiv-xv (1960) [hereinafter cited as
DEWEY].

53. Id. Experience to the instrumentalist meant more than it did to the Nineteenth Century British positivist. Instrumentalism sought to broaden conceptions of experience beyond sense perception.
54. MINAR, supra note I, at 358.
55. Id.
56. MINAR, supra note I1,at 357-58.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 362.
59. J. DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 26-27 (1960).
60. DEWEY, supra note 52, at x.

61. Id. at xii.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 267-68. Dewey stated his point in the following manner:
This philosophy is sufficiently well presented for our purposes in the idea of John Locke,
the author, one may say, of the philosophy of Liberalism in its classic sense. Freedom is
power to act in accordance with choice. It is actual ability to carry desire and purpose into
operation, to execute choices when they are made ... In the later eighteenth century,
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of individuals as endowed with an equipment of fixed and ready made capacities, the operation of which if unobstructed by external restrictions would be
freedom, and a freedom which would almost automatically solve political and
economic problems." 6 4 But he noted, this is not the true net result. Instead, class

oppression continued with the substituted privileged economic class oppressing
the non-privileged class in new and different ways.6 5 Moreover, because this
theory thusly misconceives freedom, the social institutions, infused with these
attitudes cannot solve-the problems which are created by a technological society.
Classical Liberalism prevents us from discovering how our social institutions
function most effectively when infused with a sense of human freedom which is
premised on the dynamic "development and use of intellect."66 As Dewey stated
the point, "[f]aw, government, institutions, all social arrangements must be informed with a rationality that corresponds to the order of the whole .. .."67 discovered by the intellect. He deduced that social "[f]reedom is a growth, an attainment, not an original possession, and it is attained by idealization of institutions
and law and the active participation of individuals in their loyal
maintenance, . . ."68
Fifth is the important merging of pragmatic political thought with the
Established European socialist thought to create the populist, New Deal political ideas. This development, together with its offshoot the spate of New Deal
social legislation, probably represents one of the best examples of the creative
political will of humans expressing more communitarian orientations.'9
Sixth, and last, is the diverse body of jurisprudential thinking euphoniously
called "American Legal Realism. '70 Succintly stated, these ideas struggled to
bring law into line with social needs. Rather than ignoring the social facts or
experience, the effort was made to stress them as the sine qua non of the legal
prescriptions. 7 Hence, the law took on a dynamic character ever capable of
attention shifted from power to execute choice to power to carry wants into effect, by
means of fre'e-that is. unimpeded-labor and exchange. The test of free institutions was
the relation they bore to the unobstructed play of wants in industry and commerce and to
the enjoyment of the fruits of labor. This notion blended with the earlier political idea to
form the philosophy of Liberalism so influential in a large part of the nineteenth century.
(italics in original)
64. Id. at 269-70.
65. Id. at 270-71.
66. I. at 273.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 275.
69. M INAR, supra note 11, at 38 1.The view of experimenting with communitarian orientations is
not discussed by Minar. This view is set forth by the book review. But see SOCIALIST THOUGHT at
534 (A. Fried & R. Sanders ed. 1964).
70. See. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW (1961)[hereinafter cited as STONE], for
a full discussion of this and the broader topic of sociological jurisprudence. See also, MINAR, supra
note 11, at 386, and Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence 25 HARV. L. REV. 513
(1912).
71. A favorite quote of writers to demonstrate this era is Mr. Justice 0. W. Holmes: "[t]he life of
the law has not been the life of logic:... it has been experience." 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
Law 1 (1881).
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changing social conditions and having social conditions change it. The conjunction of " 'realities' of societal needs and societal relationships" 72 was viewed as
the wellspring for the law.
Having set forth the above ideas, attention can return to a critique of Stone's
analysis. But specifically, what questions can be asked about his analysis? Perhaps, what is the value of his ideas? Does he recommend a realistic social control
scheme which will regulate large corporations in a manner geared to achieve
their social accountability? Then too, does he give us a jurisprudential explanation of how to restore partial harmony to the modern alienated person who Bartleby represents? (The focus is not simply on the rebellious, sensitized person
who Ba rtleby represents, but on all modern exiles who he also represents.)
A helpful gauge in assessing the realism and efficacy of Stone's analysis is a
very penetrating thesis developed by Neil W. Chamberlain in his book The
Limits of CorporateResponsibility.73 In this book, Chamberlain similarly seeks
to discuss the subject of regulating corporate behavior. His thesis is that corporate social responsibility is extremely difficult to achieve. Large corporations
can do little to solve social problems. Neither the "Corporate Responsibility
Thesis," or "Social Engineering Thesis" can sincerely affect social ills. 74 Big
corporations are trapped in a business system energized and measured by profit
maximizing. They inherently function on the principle of returning profit for
original capital investment. Hence, the public cannot anticipate or expect them
to be socially responsible. Then too, Chamberlain notes several other limitations. These corporations lack true unification and aggregation of resources to
seriously plan, coordinate, and control remedial actions. Also, they possess an
"internal community" which serves as a restraining force. Furthermore, the corporations will frequently close ranks with a mesmerized government to injure
the public interest.7 5 Finally, the corporations provide for the needs, psychologically and materially, of most Americans, which means outward pressure to
change can be discouraged.7 6 Taken together, Chamberlain's perceived con72.
73.
74.
75.

See MINAR, supra note I1, at 388-89.
CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 16.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. See ROGERS, supra note 9. His thesis is that the technological grip on society is possible

because government gives large corporations a "beneficiary and a government sponsor." He notes
that "technological politics" becomes the rule of the day with corporations minimizing and coopting
the government by the techniques of "political influence, concoction of technical data, and
propaganist appeals." Id. at 411.
76. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 16, at 201, states this point:

The large corporations are dominant in American culture because they have won widespread acceptance for the values that they champion-the notion for a good life whose
focus is material accumulation and consumption, the ideal of a constitutional order

based more on private autonomy and freedom of action than on the hierarchical order
the government control, a conception of distributive justice that rests on equality of op-

portunity for all to make as much of, and for, themselves as their capabilities and motivation permit.
These values obviously conduce to the corporations' own advantage: the materialistic
ideal generates support for their expansion and security; the extension to them of roughly

the same autonomy accorded the individual gives them a philosophical basis for the
greater power that in fact they possess relative to the individual; equality of opportunity
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straints paint a picture of external and internal communities locked in a mad embrace (danse macabre?)which severly limit the corporation's capacity to affect
social problems. The net result is that corporations must follow what Chamberlain calls the "Limited Responsibility Thesis."77 He concludes, therefore, that the
most meaningful manner to assert control over these mammoth business machines and their effect on social problems is by ". . . rewriting the rules (con'7
straints) under which all corporations would operate.
Do Stone's ideas transcend this "Limited Responsibility Thesis" 7 9 (which
Chamberlain does not attempt systematically to do)? If so, how well do they
achieve this end? In point of fact, Stone's ideas in Part IV of the book, his piece
de resistance, do attempt to transcend this thesis. He "rewrites the rules."
Pointedly, he does so by focusing on those "critical organization variables"
mentioned previously; the internal structures and operations of corporations or
"key decision making positions" where change can be effected. He admits,
however, that according to actual operations of modern megacorporations the
management structure is the important decision making center. 80 Nonetheless,
he believes the optimum place to initiate a change is at the legal repository of
authority, the board of director level. But he acknowledges that past experiences
demonstrate the limits of this calculated effort; the environment and
dynamics of present board of director operations will not permit much change.
Still, he argues that the board level reforms coupled with other changes in the
corporate operations are necessary for a unified attack on the problem.
maintains the egalitarian flavor, but continues to accord special advantage to those who
start from a privileged position.
Because social values and corporate interests coalesce, each reinforces the other. Because
the welfare of so many is anchored in corporate society, those who would radically alter
that society are relatively few in number.
In sum, he notes, in an oxymoronic manner, that the corporation "has sought to confer, in
Milton's poignant line from Samson Agonistes, 'bondage with ease in a land of plenty.'" (delicious
cruelty) (Citations omitted) Id. at 96.
77. Id. at 7-8.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Others attempt to transcend this "Limited Responsibility Thesis" by similarly "rewriting the
rules." See note 16 supra. Some of the attempts might be interpreted as more exhaustive scholarship because the writers delve more deeply than Stone into one or more points. See Vagts, Book
Review, 49 So. CALIF. L. REV. 635 (1976). Nonetheless, how many others have attempted to penetrate so deeply into the inner workings of the corporation while using psychoanalytic jurisprudence
and Deweyian philosophy to reconceptualize the rules? How many others attempt such a broad
attack (in contrast to depth of research) on not only the authoritative decision-making process within
the corporation, but also the ethics and behavioral patterns of the corporate culture? In sum, Stone's
attempt to rewrite the rules stretches from a reexamination of the corporate problem, through a reexamination of the legal personality of the corporation, through a reexamination of the concept of
social responsibility, through a reexamination of the decision making process of corporations, to an
analysis of the control of the behavior of the corporate culture. Few, if any, can make such a statement on the breath of their analysis.
80. See Chamberlain, supra note 16, at 181-83. He quotes one business executive who notes:
"Management as long as it's successful and things are going well, is more than likely to have reversed
the flow of authority from the boards to management so that it runs from management to boards."
Id. at 182.
But see, Needham, Does the Board Need Waking Up? N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1976, § 3, at 14,
col. 2. (Business and Finance). The use of audit committees conceivably signals some attempt to return, albeit limited in scope, authority to the Boards.
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To accomplish the broad reform, he recommends initially isolating the corporate behavior most objectionable (and obverse desired). Restated, he means
behavior in which public interest and corporate interest overlap to some degree.
He cryptically types the various behaviors Class A and Class B.' Class A behavior represents the type where the public interest and corporate interest most
parallel and overlap. For example, Class A behavior would involve avoiding
such things as gross financial manipulation, criminal violations, or racial discriminations. 82 Class B behavior represents the type where greater conflict between public interest and corporate interest exists. For example, Class B behavior would involve pollution and other environmental harms. 83 Then, following a mapping out of the controllable behaviors, he discusses the control of these
classes of behavior. Starting with Class A behavior (simpler to control), he
argues that this behavior can be controlled by such broad changes as eliminating
inside directors, and redefining broad functions. Class B behavior, however, involves more subtle, complex problems less subject to the Class A approach. To
counter the problems created by Class B behavior, he recommends that a careful
reworking of the "General Public Directorship" (GPD)84 concept coupled with
the use of the "Special Public Directorship" (SPD) 85 concept where applicable.
Nonetheless, he recommends that the GPD receive a much clearer and sharper
redefinition of its functions to avoid the past limitations and failures. For instance, these directors inter alia, can serve as the corporate superego, liaison to
the legislature, and "hot line" for the "whistle blowing" employees. 86 In addition,
these GPDs need to be invested with special powers. For instance, the GPDs can
hire their own staff, requisition corporate surveys, and be assured of placement
on the relevant corporate committees. 87
Unlike the GPD, Stone argues that the SPD is a unique mechanism to be used
in very special circumstances. As he notes, this device should represent reactions
to society's

"...

identifying critical areas of social concern that are deemed most

likely amenable to their influence."8 In short, these circumstances represent
moments when the law seems unable to control adequately a particularly troublesome form of corporate behavior. (Repeated and recurring violations of pollution laws, product safety laws, and the like.) Moreover, he perceives astutely
STONE, supra note 70, at 136-38.
82. Id. at 135-37.
83. Id. at 137-38.
84. Id. at 152-73. Stone resorts to a sales or gross revenue test to determine corporations who

81.

would qualify for use of GPDs. Similarly, he mentions a Federal corporations Commission as a body
entrusted with authority for nominating these GPDs. Id. at 158-59.
In the 94th Congress, Ist
Session, May 22, 1975, the Honorable James V. Stanton introduced to
the Judiciary committee H.R. 748 1, relating to the establishment of a Federal Chartering Commission. The Commission would not have the authority relative to nominating G PDs, but the bill used a
sales test (annualized) to determine regulated industrial corporations (motor vehicle, petroleum, and
steel industries). p. 20.
See also, Stone, Public Directors Merit a Try, 54 HARV. Bus. REV. 20 (1976).
85. STONE, supra note 70, at 174-83.
86. Id. at 160-7 1.
87. Id. at 171-73.
88. Id. at 174.
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this behavior can be classified into two general types of fact patterns, the
"demonstrated delinquency situation" and the "generic industry problem." 9
Meaning of course, Stone has supplied us with helpful categorizations of this
special behavior which can be used to activate and tailor the SPD to regulate this
behavior.
Despite stressing the board level for initiating changes, Stone does not ignore
the management structure. He recommends that the law mandate creation of
certain offices within the corporate structure beneath the board level as the foci
for initiating additional changes. (Intertwine with the corporate charter privilege for example.) As in the case of the board, he suggests creation of offices to be
invested with authority to operate at certain key points where experience has demonstrated that trouble easily develops. Hence, the corporation should be required to identify and select persons with unique qualifications to fill positions
such as corporate officers responsible for pollution and product safety.90
Realizing that a broad based approach must be undertaken to solve the complex corporate problem, Stone recommends three additional complimentary
changes. First, he recommends a restructuring and revitalizing of the flow of
information in the corporation. 91As he argues, society needs to consider "mending the information net" 92 to properly channel data about the corporation's
activities to and from the decision making centers. And to accomplish this objective, he recommends the creation of an "office responsible for gathering and collating" 93 data contained within and without the corporation. In addition, he
recommends creation of a statutory requirement that ". . . the organizational
pathwva vs have to lay certain information at the feet of specified people . . .,94
within the corporation. The last idea for accomplishing this objective is the suggestion to disseminate information out of the corporation into the general public. In sum, he argues for statutory requirements which mandate three things:
that the corporation periodically disclose certain information; that it fairly submit to government inspection; and that the "whistle blower" 95 be protected.
The second complimentary change is the redesigning of the decision making
process. And very importantly, redesigning it to instill responsibility in a
Dewei'ian sense. As Stone forcefully states in this brief quote:
"... the proponents of corporate responsibility do wrong to put so
much emphasis on what corporations are deciding rather than on how
they are deciding-the corporate decision process itself. The sort of
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 175; See note 84 supra.
STONE, supra note 70, at 184-98.
Id. at 199-216.
/d. at 199.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 209.
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'responsibility' we ought to be developing in our corporationsis not
exclusively responsibility in the rule-following sense but also responsibility in its cognitive aspects. . ,"96
In essence, the goal is to transform the corporate decision making process; make
it approximate the deliberative process which responsible human beings follow.
Thus, we should expect, inter alia, that the corporation will use perception, that
it will weigh the consequences of its actions, that it will consider a moral calculus,
and that it will make a justification for its action. Moreover, he recognizes that
cognition is a multifaceted process which has various levels. He argues that the
process actually was begun with the restructuring of the information retrieval
system of the corporation. This was the entry level conduct which is equivalent
to the low level cognitive activity of human perception. 97 But he notes, however,
the challenge is to move beyond this low level function to "'higher' level cognitive functions. 98 To accomplish this evolution into the other facets of the process
of cognition, he recommends the adaptation of several approaches. One approach he recommends is to remove certain".. . decisions of large social concern
out of the hands of lower-level functionairies and insist they be put in the hands
of others higher in the organization."9 9 A second approach he recommends is to
broaden the number of interested and affected groups "who might with legitimacy be brought into" l°° the deliberative process. The final approach he
recommends is the use of the device of "mandated findings."' 0 1 He seeks statutorily to require the corporation to justify its conduct in a prepared impact statement which outlines the ramifications of the proposed actions prior to undertaking them.
With the third complimentary change, Stone demonstrates (reminiscent of
Chamberlain) his appreciation of the subtlety of the psychological aspects of
modern corporate operations. He argues that the various recommendations he
sets forth, although meaningful corrections to present systemic deficiencies, are
insufficient alone to effect social control. As he notes, "[ft]o be really effective, the
law has to be able to persuade, or at least make sense to the community it is
supposed to govern." 10 2 But as he continues, "[S)o long as the underlying attitudes are left untouched, some measure of resistence-ofcircumvention, disregard,and foot dragging-is inevitable..."103 In short, the law must seek to
control these attitudinal vectors converging on the collective will to change by
reforming them. To accomplish this reformation, his first suggestion is to recommend moral exhortation. Society should demand voluntary reformation for
96. Id. at 217. See also SCIENCE AND THE CREATIVE SPIRIT (K. DEUTSCH, F. PRIESTLY, H. BROWN,
D. HAWKINS, & H. BRAND, ed. 1958). Deutsch States "[t]o act morally is in one sense the opposite
of acting blindly. It is acting in the presumed knowledge of what it is that we are doing." Id. at 121.
97.

STONE,

supra note 70, at 217.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 220.
101. Id. at 221.

102. Id. at 228. Stone posits a separate existence and ontongeny for the aggregation of persons
and objects which surround the corporate activity. See also CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 16, at 80-96.
103. STONE, supra note 70, at 229.
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the corporation culture by imploring its members to exhibit a Deweyian sense of
intelligence. Pointedly, the culture should subordinate and sublimate "certain
ego-centered goals/drives"' 0 4 for particular purposes to achieve more socially
responsible activities. For example, the "profit orientation""' 5 can be limited by
a concern for health of workers and pollution of the environment. Nonetheless,
Stone alerts his reader this focus can be deceptive. For society is confronted with
more than simple "capitalist greed"'4 06 run amok. A multitude of attitudes and
forces impact on the community's conduct. For instance, he notes that "profitconnected" motives such as desire for prestige,107 "corporate insensitivity to
their workers""M and worker irresponsibility and sabotage' 9 fill this universe.
Thus, the society must do more than attempt to focus on one attitude, or even
leave change to the corporate culture itself. Society must take time carefully to
delineate the "whole range of underlying attitudes and forces"' " land their manifestations in undesirable corporate activity. (In sociological and psychological
terms a complex "group dynamics phenomenon" which requires complex responses.)
To assist society in achieving this difficult task, he recommends two specific
approaches. One approach is for society to identify and support the relevant
"norms and/or subgroups""i ' which preexist within the corporation that can
easily become associated with the desirable ideals and attitudes to be instilled.
Theoretically, he envisions increasing the potency of these subgroups'12;
104. Id. at 230.
105. But ef Bowman & Howe, Strategic Posture Toward Corporate Social Responsibility,
XVIII CAL. MANAGEMENT REV. 49 (1975). One of the interesting questions the authors examine is

whether corporate social responsibility really conflicts with the investor interest in profitability.
Using the categories and examples from the Business and Societ, Review, see note 115 infra, they
conclude the stronger the social conscience the stronger the profitability of the corporation measured by return on investment.
106. STONE. supra note 70, at 235.

107. Id. at 234.
108. id.
109. Id. at 235.
110. Id. at 236. Stone notes that we may need to specialize our study. We must locate and
understand the group behavior and normative patterns of various types of corporations and of
industries.
To map our way, we ought to begin by learning more about whydifferent corporationslike different political administrations-seem to permeate themselves with their own
characteristic attitudes toward law abidance and 'good citizenship' generally. 'Law breaking,' some sociologists have observed, 'can become a normative pattern within certain
corporations, and violation norms may be shared between corporations. and their
executives.' . . . One would want to know, too, why different industries manage to evolve
their own customs, habits, and attitudes. Id. at 237-38.
And following this recognition through study, we must seek to positively exploit this knowledge.
"Can we identify the variables that makes some more responsible than others, and put this knowledge to work by directly manipulating those variables?" Id. at 238.
Ill. Id. at 238.
112. The examples Stone uses to illustrate his point are engineers and lawyers. Interestingly, these
groups are often called and view themselves as "professionals." He shows a perceptive grasp of professional group dynamics which can be used to countervail against institutional loosening of restraints on antisocial conduct. He infers that these groups' ethical codes, as well as the feared loss of
prestige within and without their respective professions, can be manipulated to serve as stimuli to
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the members can reinforce and further the existing relevant norms and desirable
ideas and attitudes (modern day knight-errants). An example he uses is the discovery in one corporation that the engineer's desire not to lose personal esteem
could have been associated with the attitude of pursuing competition as the path
to profits, instead of pursuing a price fixing conspiracy.
The other approach he recommends attempts to address a more troublesome
point. What should be done when the desirable ideals and attitudes to be
adopted differ from the existing attitudes of the society and the corporate culture?
He recommends that society control the corporate milieu by doing ". . . nothing
less than providing the organization with a new internal rhetoric-the special
'vocabulary of motives' that every culture, and every cultural subgroup, provides
its members with as its own 'legitimate' reasons for doing thines."''

3

In es-

sence, Stone semiotically stresses the society's need to provide the community
with a vernacular which is energized with the desired social ideals; to recreate a
clear road map of alternative behavioral patterns. (Does not involve an attempt
to replace profit motive, however.) Examples of deliberate ways to bring about
this change are the use of social audits, achievement awards (e.g. "good guys of
the year"),' 14 and intracorporate interchanges (sensitivity sessions).
Concerning the success of Stone in transcending the "Limited Responsibility
5
Thesis," several additional comments can be set forth. 11
First, Stone does a very
effective accountability
thesis
by
constructing
more
good job to transcend this
oriented controls which supplement the "traditional legal strategies." The intertwining and interrelating of the board of director and management changes with
redesigning the information flow, the changing of the decision-making process,
and the attempt to change the corporate community's attitudes is a recognition
of the theoritecal and practical problems which were posed by Chamberlain.
Clearly, this scheme possesses the multi-faceted character necessary to address
make the members knights-errant. In essence, the institutional roles, with all the ethical, symbolic
adherence to rules, and self-image trappings will override the irrational institutional aspects of the
role of the "organizational man."
Nonetheless, the analysis is unclear specifically on how to accomplish this task. Apparently, he
is indicating some statutory enactment (whose outlines are not given) is necessary. Conceivably, he is
recommending also social rewards, public education, and sensitivity sessions. Possibly the former
and latter should be combined. The particulars get lost in the euphoria of analysis. Irrespective, the
typology appears worthy of consideration even if not fully blue-printed. For an interesting discussion of the typology of the corporate executive who would be exploitable for the same purposes. See
M. MACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN 285 (1976).

113.

STONE,

supra note 70, at 242.

114. e.g., The 1975 Good Guys: 13 Companies Win Awardsfor CorporateSocial Responsibility,
16 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 18 (1976).
115. Several miscellaneous criticisms may be lodged against;Stone's analysis.,See Vagts, Book
Review, 49 So. CALIF. L. REV. 635 (1976). In essence, Professor Vagts challenges Stone for failing
to make a more comprehensive analysis and for not having more thorough scholarship.Some of the
criticisms do raise genuine challenges to Stone's analysis and work. They demonstrate the need for
more study and analysis. The challenges however, do not seriously overshadow Stone's achievements.
For those seeking to be more disparaging in their criticism, they will be hard pressed to demonstrate that the book is a populist diatribe replete with the triad of effusive rhetoric, poor scholarship,
and the absence of common sense. Or as Chamberlain put it more gracefully, "touching in their (its)
idealism, but out of touch with reality." CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 16, at 30. See note 79 supra.
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the subtly complex problems of control which the more simplistic approaches
lack. As Chamberlain admits, only thoroughly "rewriting the rules" in this manner will work. Moreover, Stone synthesizes many important intellectual ideas to
formulate an approach which effectively rewrites the rules.
Second, Stone perceives the need to challenge the jurisprudential foundation
of the corporation and of their behavioral regulations in order to construct more
effective controls. Accordingly, his challenge to the traditional jurisprudential
view of the corporation as having a legal capacity similar to humans intellectually awakens society to a different perspective. He argues persuasively that
society is failing to come to grips with the fact that the megacorporations are
really complex legal collectives. They must be viewed as multitiered collections
of experiences, senses, and ideals which interrelate with society in complicated
ways; they are utterly incapable of control through schemes constructed on
classical liberal political or economic philosophies. A control scheme based on
the classical liberal theory developed relative to humans is doomed to failure.
Consequently, Stone's tour de force is his attempt jurisprudentially to view
megacorporations and their control from a more "communitarian" perspective. 116
Third, Stone perceives the need to challenge the jurisprudential foundation
of social accountability in the concept of the legal controls of corporate behavior. He achieves a tour de force with the merging of the socio-psychological
dynamics of these legal collectives and Dewey's view of individual responsibility;
the end product is a legal conceptualization which emits greater socially responsibility. From his unmasking of the corporate problem to the arrival at his "conjunction of truth and social 'reality,' " i.e., the restructuring and redesigning the
decision making process, and altering patterns of behavior of the various subgroups in the corporate community, he demonstrates an understanding of the
sociology and psychology of social-responsibility in the modern context. Thus,
he demonstrates again the failure of Classical-liberalism as the foundation of our
social control mechanism; it leads to a definition of social responsibility which
ignores the sense of the interrelatedness and interconnectedness of experience,
and ignores the role of human intelligence. An in the process, Stone extends
American Legal Realism, and gives greater meaning to Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence.
Fourth, Stone affects our political philosophy, and therefore the vernacular
and motivation of our rulemakers, in a manner reminiscent of Pragmatism and
New Deal policies. His "critical theory" extends the instrumentalism of Dewey,
thereby demonstrating its continued vitality in political philosophy, and the
American political lexicon. At numerous points he interweaves into his analysis,
inter alia, the concepts of human will," 7 human potential," 18 human experi116. See note 37 supra.
117. Minar, supra note 11, at 358.
118. id.
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ences,'1 9 interrelatedness of experiences, 20 truth as a useful prediction of ex22
periences,121 and human associations.
Fifth, Stone's analysis indicates his perception of society's need politically to
reexamine the social interest in comparison to the corporate interest. Clearly, he
takes a position on America's time honored wavering between the community
emphasis and the individual emphasis. In his estimation, the only realistic and
effective means to reassert control over corporate behavior is through elevating
community interest over individual (corporation qua individual) interest.i23 To
achieve his objective, he relies on ideas traceable to the "National Covenant" and
"General Will" notions mentioned above. These shared beliefs strongly shape
the community oriented view of power in the national dialogue over the impact
of social interaction with large corporations. Consequently, Stone's analysis is
further refutation of the classical liberal theory as a political basis of control for
regulating corporate behavior. (retrieves and revives the basic political community-Tyranny ends, law begins.)
Sixth, Stone stimulates those legally trained on behalf of social change to
overcome imaginatively the syndrome of complicity with large corporations. His
analysis seeks to put lawyers (and urge them to be) in the forefront of clamoring
jurisprudentially and politically for and evangelizing on behalf of a substitution of control mechanisms for corporate behavior. In sum, he renews the faith
of some in the belief of the lawyer's capacity (also as a moral valuer) and willingness to intelligently use his/her powers of analysis on society's behalf. (Lawyer's
social responsibility). Accordingly, he seeks to harness one of the most
significant social forces in America, the shapers and keepers of the laws.
Concerning the second question posed about Stone's jurisprudential explanation of how to restore partial harmony to the alienated human, the book falls
short. He fails because he does not take his jurisprudential analysis far enough.
He obliquely treats the really significant matter of human freedom. 24 The book
does not articulate the importance of and thusly take the opportunity to clearly
reassess the concept of human freedom in the context of megacorporations. As
he demonstrates the bankruptcy of Classical Liberalism as applied to corpora119. Id.
120. I.
121. i. at 359-61.
122. hI. at 366-79.
123. hI. at 366.

124. Contra,see notes 104-114, supra. Nonetheless, the author considers their discussion oblique.
See, e.g. notes 67-69, supra. Inferentially, Dewey indicated that to infuse social institutions with the
type of cognitive process he championed was to embrace his view of individual freedom. Accordingly, this might raise the argument that if Stone embraces the Deweyian analysis, he addresses the
concept of individual freedom. But two replies can be made to this claim. One, Stone does not
articulate clearly this point of Dewey in his book. He is silent about the other side of Dewey's
analysis, leaving the great concern over individual freedom for inference. Second, Dewey clearly
demonstrates the focus on social control of institutional behavior is relevant insofar as it assists us in
analyzing the concept of individual freedom. Society's freedom or institutional responsibility are
important by-products of the analysis of individual freedom. In fact, in a circular fashion, the
society's freedom or corporate social responsibility can only be achieved if the individuals who
populate such institutions fully understand and achieve their own individual freedoms. Thus,
Dewey starts from an exploration of the primal question-what is individual freedom.
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tions, Stone needs to do the same for humans relative to their involvment with
corporations. Corporations are successful because of the ability to create and
maintain "wide-spread acceptance for the values" 25 they promote. To be effective, he must strive to reach and weaken these values which are inculcated in the
population at large, by stressing the necessity of reexamining the concept of
human freedom. Aside from showing that "[h]uman beings must also create
social institutions of production and life which affirm human values,"126 he
should demonstrate that the human beings must view themselves in the same
manner; they must reexamine their human values as it affects their sense of individual freedom. But he stresses only the act of putting corporations back under
the leash, not the defeat of those values of society through which corporations
27
strangle human existence and thusly human freedom.
Reformulated, any jurisprudence that seeks to be effective must address the
human needs of creating a concept of individual freedom in a human existence
which is constructed on the "possibilities of loving, trusting,"'128 rather than exploitation and manipulation. Hence, Stone should explicitly state his appreciaexcept in a society which struggles to
tion of the fact that "there is no freedom ...
create the social conditions, the economic conditions, and the jurisprudence of
freedom, love and liberation." 129 In sum, he needs to underscore the develop30
ment of ajurisprudence of human needs," or a "jurisprudence of insurgence,"1
if for no other reason than to strengthen his arguments for urging the public to
adopt his ideas to increase control of corporations.
In conclusion, Stone's Bartleby does have a clearer vision of the "conjunction
of truth and social 'reality' " relative to controlling certain corporate behavior.
He has given moving testimony to Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's earlier observation. Excitedly, Stone's Bartleby would leave his Wall Street job energized to
share with society his critical analysis of social life and his critical theory of how
to rectify certain ills. In short, he would want to share his road map for social reform. (Paraphrasing Beckett, "I can do it, I will do it!") Unwilling to play the role
of Jeremiah sounding the trumpet of disaster, Stone's Bartleby (in a Deweyian fashion) would seek to lead modern man from the intellectual plane into the
heart of social action. ' 3' Thus, despite the book's short-comings, it is a valuable
social, political, and jurisprudential discourse. But perhaps in the final analysis,
all we need state about Stone (and see as his anthem) is what Henry David
125. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 16, at 201. See, note 76, supra.

126. Tigar, Book Review, 86 HARV. L. REV. 785, 794 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TIGAR].
127. But see, E. DoSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, 233-34(1957)and E. FROMM, ESCAPE

FROM FREEDOM (1941). Not all men seek freedom of any type. In fact, some persons so "fear and
dread" freedom that they easily seek "technological escapism" or some other form of escapism.
128. Tigar, supra note 126, at 794.
129. Id. at 795.

130. Id.
131. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1976, § 6, p. 16 Headlines. What the New York Times editors stated
about the writing of recent Nobel prize winner Saul Bellow seems appropos to Stone's Bartleby: he is
"alienated, but not passive or apathetic"
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Thoreau announced about his book Walden: "I do not propose to write an ode
to dejection, but to brag as lustily as chanticleer in the morning standing on his
32
roost, if only to wake my neighbors up."'
ANDREW W. HAINES**
132. H. THOREAU, WALDEN & ON THE DUTY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, Holt, Rinehart and Winston

1965).
**Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; A.B. 1966, University of
Minnesota; J.D. 1969, University of Michigan.
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